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“Chasing the first high”: memory sampling in drug choice
Aaron M. Bornstein 1,2,3 and Hanna Pickard 4,5
Although vivid memories of drug experiences are prevalent within clinical contexts and addiction folklore (“chasing the first high”),
little is known about the relevance of cognitive processes governing memory retrieval to substance use disorder. Drawing on recent
work that identifies episodic memory’s influence on decisions for reward, we propose a framework in which drug choices are biased
by selective sampling of individual memories during two phases of addiction: (i) downward spiral into persistent use and (ii) relapse.
Consideration of how memory retrieval influences the addiction process suggests novel treatment strategies. Rather than try to
break learned associations between drug cues and drug rewards, treatment should aim to strengthen existing and/or create new
associations between drug cues and drug-inconsistent rewards.
Neuropsychopharmacology (2020) 45:907–915; https://doi.org/10.1038/s41386-019-0594-2
INTRODUCTION
Human choices are shaped by awareness of past experiences and
anticipation of future possibilities. Faced with choices in the here
and now, we draw on memories to imagine the different paths
before us depending on which way we choose. These memories
drive us forward one way or another, as we seek to avoid prior
mistakes or relive past experiences. Such memory-based decision-
making is familiar from our own lives and a core topic in the
cognitive neuroscience of memory. It is also a prevalent theme
within clinical contexts and addiction folklore, as demonstrated by
the trope of “chasing the first high”:
“The first time I took a drink it was like the black and white
world became Technicolor… The first time I smoked a
cigarette, I can act it out for you, but then you can't record
that. It felt like this. (Demonstrates – sighs.) […]. It relaxed my
mind, my body, my breathing, everything. And that is what I
was continuing to search for every time I smoked a cigarette
after that” [1].
Yet despite empirical data showing that hippocampus and
adjacent structures, which in humans are tightly linked to episodic
memory, are critical to addiction-related behaviors [2–4], and
recent work highlighting the role of drugs in memory encoding
[5, 6], the role of memory retrieval remains less well-understood,
and potentially crucial [7–10].
In the field of decision making, there is emerging consensus
that processes occurring during memory retrieval play a distinct
role in biasing choice [11–13]. Our aim in this article is to situate
memory retrieval within the theory of addiction mechanisms.
Drawing on recent work that identifies a key role for episodic
memory in decisions for reward [14–20], we propose a framework
in which drug choices are biased by selective sampling of
individual memories during two key phases of addiction:
(i) downward spiral into persistent use and (ii) relapse. Existing
mechanistic accounts that posit addiction as a disorder of value
learning [21–24] or as uniquely determined by incentive
sensitization and cue-induced craving [25–27] or habit-like
compulsion [28–30] have difficulty explaining both phases.
Memory sampling offers a framework for value-based choice
which incorporates features of these mechanisms, allowing
flexibility in choice while explaining the outsized influence of
particular past experiences (Box 1). In essence, the core idea is that
episodic memories of highly rewarding past experiences [31–33]
can be elicited by associated cues and contexts and come to bias
present choices, as opposed to these choices either being
determined by a static summary of past outcomes or driven by
inflexible compulsion; importantly, these memories and processes
can be conscious or unconscious (Box 2). Memory sampling as a
mechanism is therefore distinct from, but complementary to,
incentive sensitization and craving [25–27] in functioning as a
causal intermediary between drug-associated cues and contexts
on the one hand, and drug choices and behavior on the other.
THE PUZZLE OF ADDICTION
All addiction originates in non-addictive psychoactive drug
consumption. In humans, this consumption is goal-directed: a
means to achieve represented outcomes, such as their anticipated
effects on mental states [8, 34]. These effects may be intrinsically
valuable, e.g., hedonia, or relief from boredom, pain, stress and
psychological suffering; or they may facilitate valued behaviors,
e.g., sociability, sex, and task performance. Regardless of the goal
of consumption, the majority of users do not transition to
addiction [35–37], maintaining patterns of consumption that
exploit drug benefits while incurring minimal costs.
The transition from non-addictive use to addiction occurs when
this balance tips and drug costs come to outweigh drug benefits
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[38]. However, this immediately complicates demarcating non-
addicted and addicted use. Costs and benefits must be weighed
relative to values, which vary between individuals, including
people with SUDs and observers; moreover, contingent, environ-
mental factors, e.g., status and wealth, can protect against costs
[38, 39]. This individuality and complexity is reflected in the DSM-
5 [40] diagnostic criteria for SUD that is both polythetic and
graded from mild to severe. These criteria include: (i) cravings and
failures to limit use as intended, as (ii) drugs come to occupy
increasing time and attentional focus, despite (iii) incurring
severe risks and negative consequences, including e.g., drug-
related mental and physical health problems, and loss of
important relationships, social standing, employment, or housing.
In countries that criminalize drug possession and stigmatize
drug users, there is also risk of criminal sanction and social
ostracization.
Continued consumption at the expense of other goods and
despite costs is central to the construct of addiction and defines
what is so puzzling about it as a form of behavior. Even though
drug choices are initially goal-directed, they come to appear to
have features not in keeping with purposive behavior, in so far as
they contradict first-person reports of desired abstinence and
incur costs that, at least from an observer’s vantage point, ought
to tip the balance and disincentivize use. Put crudely, the puzzle of
addiction is to understand why individuals keep using when drugs
no longer appear worth it [38].
This general puzzle of addiction is particularly striking in relation
to two key phases of the addiction process:
(i) Spiraling into addiction. Initial stages of consumption prior to
addiction typically involve highly rewarding drug experiences. By
contrast, the spiral into addiction is characterized not only by
increasing negative consequences but by diminishing drug
Box 1: Choice variability and decision time in memory sampling and reinforcement learning
The dominant approach to modeling value-based choice captures value learning and action selection using models derived from reinforcement learning (RL). In these
models, values of choice options are learned incrementally, over repeated experience, and updated by the degree to which received reward deviates from expectations
(Eq. 1). Actions are selected with probability proportional to the difference in expected values (Eq. 2). This type of model is fruitfully applied to explaining behavioral and
neural signatures of simple choices [129, 130], complex plans [131–133], and aberrant choices such as in substance use disorder (SUD) [21, 22, 24].
Q a; sð Þ ¼ Q a; sð Þ þ α R Q a; sð Þ½  (1)
P a ¼ Að Þ / exp βQ A; sð Þð ÞP
a0 exp βQ a
0; sð Þð Þ (2)
Formally, learning involves comparing the reward experienced (R) as resulting from action (a) against the value the agent expected to result (Q(a)). Expected value is adjusted
by the difference between these two quantities—the Reward Prediction Error (RPE)—scaled by a learning rate parameter, α. A foundational finding is that this difference
term closely matches firing rates of neurons in the dopaminergic midbrain [129, 134, 135], suggesting that one role of dopamine is to signal this quantity.
Recent work shows that the average behavioral patterns captured by these models can also be captured by a different approach, in which expectations are not determined
by incremental learning, but according to memories of individual past choices, recalled at the time of decision in proportion to the similarity of past states s’ to current state s
[13, 15–17, 20] (Eq. 3). This inherently probabilistic value-setting guides choice dynamically, integrating “samples” of action values (Qi) computed on the basis of remembered
choice outcomes i (Eq. 4) until achieving a decision threshold (z) (Eq. 5). The model also predicts the time necessary to reach a decision (response time; RT), as a function of
the memory-derived values (Eq. 6).
P Qi a; sð Þ ¼ R a; s0ð Þð Þ / js; s0 j1 (3)
Vdiff ¼
X
i
Qi a; sð Þ  Qi a0; sð Þ½  (4)
P a ¼ Að Þ / 1
1þ exp 2Vdiff zð Þ (5)
RT / z
Vdiff
tanh zVdiffð Þ (6)
As typically formulated, both models capture the fact that choices for rewarded options are likely to be repeated, and that, over time, the more rewarding option is likely to
be chosen more often. But there is a critical difference relevant to SUD. In RL, the tendency to choose an option is a function of its learned value, which is maintained as a
static quantity. Action selection uses a function of the form in Eq. 2 (but see Shteingart et al. [81] for discussion of alternative approaches) that scales the probability of a
given action a with the ratio of the value of this option to the total value to be gained among all options available. The key feature of this model for our discussion is that any
variability in choices beyond learned values is treated as “noise”—that is, symmetric and independent. This makes it difficult for the model to capture choices in SUD, which
can both persist in ignorance of recent reward and reinstate long-past preferences.
Equation 3 describes how action selection differs in memory sampling. As in RL, the probability of choosing action a is proportional to the reward value experienced from
that action in the past. However, these memories of past states (s’ ) are weighted by their sampling priority with respect to the current mental state (s; Eq. 3). Memory
selection thus determines the likelihood that a given experience will be retrieved, based on similarity between elements of the current mental context, and the context of the
past experience. Selection has been shown to be influenced by recency [17], goal congruence [88], mood-congruence [85], and an incrementally-learned estimate of the
contingencies between states in the environment [136]. These influences are likely non-exclusive, with time-varying impact on the memory retrieval process, meaning that
factors that alter the time available to make a decision, or the time it takes for memories to be recalled, can meaningfully affect choices [13] (Eqs. 4–6).
The introduction of memory sampling therefore explains seemingly erratic shifts in preference, which are usually treated as unmodeled variance or strategic exploration
[137], as instead driven by systematic influences of past experiences. This re-conceptualization of choice variability underpins our proposed explanations for the puzzles of
addiction.
Beyond the question of how well the models quantitatively account for the data, memory sampling differs from adapted RL accounts of drug choice in the type of
explanation it offers. RL as described in Eq. 1 reflects a normatively-motivated solution to the well-formed problem of learning rewards in sequential choice environments; it
is proven to converge to an optimal solution, under explicitly stated constraints. Extending the framework with additional machinery to account for behavioral and biological
signatures of SUD necessarily departs from this normative basis. For RL to explain SUD behaviors, additions are required; however, these additional mechanisms are
motivated only by these stylized findings. As a consequence the altered RL models do not share the explanatory status of the original: they can only describe the data, not
the underlying generative process. The challenge therefore remains: to identify the computational problem, and to propose a model that solves it in a way that captures the
observed data. Memory sampling does so by proposing that sequential choice is treated as non-parametric estimation, an optimal approach in situations where the
underlying state space and value function cannot be compactly represented. Therefore, memory sampling offers a normative foundation that explains behavior in both
healthy populations and SUD sufferers without need for additional mechanisms nor, critically, additional optimality criteria. From the perspective of memory sampling,
healthy and SUD individuals are solving the same computational problem via the same mechanism but with different behavioral outcomes that can be accounted for,
quantitatively, via distinctions in the content and character of experience representations and/or environmental influences on their access.
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returns: as tolerance increases, hedonia is often claimed to
decrease [25, 27]. This behavior is frustrating for standard RL
accounts of value-based choice (RL; Box 1), which base decisions
on a “running average” of experienced reward (and punishment)
outcomes. Taken alone, these models predict that drug choice
would eventually cease of its own accord. This gap can be
accounted for by introducing disordered learning signals that
result in persistent drug preference [21]; however, this leaves
abstinence to be explained via “unlearning”, which compromises
the model’s capacity to explain relapse [41]. Further, while this
model succeeds in predicting drug choice behavior that is
sensitive to the rational tradeoff against other rewards [42], it
fails to capture the rich repertoire of flexible, goal-directed drug-
seeking behaviors evident in human drug choice [24, 43].
(ii) Relapse. Quit attempts often occur when individuals hit “rock
bottom” [44] and cannot avoid facing the most severe negative
consequences of consumption [45–47]. Although medical manage-
ment can ease the effects of withdrawal, it typically remains
physically and psychologically painful to endure. Post-withdrawal,
ex-users must maintain resolve and fashion a drug-free life.
Successful quit attempts therefore not only indicate awareness of
negative consequences and motivation to abstain; they also
involve sunk costs. Why, if an ex-user is aware of drug costs and
has lived through the pain of withdrawal and its aftermath, would
they suddenly and spontaneously choose to use again? This puzzle
is similarly frustrating for standard learning accounts of value-
guided decisions, as they predict that recent experience should be
the primary determining factor in choice; instead, people with SUD
appear suddenly to reinstate past preferences without any
apparent learning in the intervening period, consistent with the
view that extinction is itself a process of new learning, rather than
overwriting previous associations [48–50].
RL accounts can be extended to incorporate atypically persistent
preferences, for instance by adding a term to the standard value
update calculation (Box 1) that reflects a dopamine “surge” at the
time of consumption [21]. Because dopamine is thought to signal
the difference between reward expected and reward received,
based on which expectation of future reward is updated, additional
dopamine distorts the signal, causing expectations to remain high
even as outcomes diminish. However, these approaches suffer
from three related problems. First, a focus on dopamine leaves the
model underspecified in its account of non-dopaminergic drugs.
Many non-dopaminergic drugs are known to indirectly cause
dopamine release [51], but this predicts a quantitative asymmetry
in addictive potential, yet to be substantiated by empirical findings
[52]. More importantly, this focus also fails to address the second
puzzle of relapse after abstinence. This second puzzle is often
explained as a form of context-dependent preference [22–24]. But
this raises two additional problems for RL accounts that must in
turn be answered, namely: where these context-dependent
preferences are stored, and how they come to be reinstated after
long periods of dormancy.
Redish et al. [22, 23] identified these challenges and proposed a
“situation recognition” component, realized by interactions
between hippocampus and PFC, that reinstates past preferences
on the basis of similarity to current context. Our proposal is
consistent with this idea and connects it with known mechanisms
of memory-guided decision-making. Specifically, we link this
“situation recognition” component to the episodic memory
system, and place particular emphasis on the dynamics of
situation recognition that are entailed by context-guided memory
sampling. We further predict that this system is instrumental not
only in relapse, but in persistent use as well. Notably, our
proposed mechanism does not exclude the possibility of atypical
dopamine response. Indeed, dopamine release is associated with
enhanced memory encoding [53, 54], which may explain why
some early drug memories are often vivid and persistent.
However, in our framework, atypical dopamine is not required to
explain behaviors of interest, consistent with the failure to find
outsized addiction potential for directly-dopaminergic drugs.
CUE-INDUCED CRAVING
Research into cue-induced craving contributes to the explanation
of both puzzles of (i) downward spiral and (ii) relapse. In animal
models, drug-associated cues, similarly to drug priming, reinstate
drug-seeking behavior after extinction and forced abstinence
[55–57]. Although an association between craving and consump-
tion in human addiction studies is contested and remains far from
well established [58, 59], there is nonetheless evidence that in
human laboratory settings, stress and drug-associated cues
predict first-person reports of craving, which is associated with
subsequent relapse in cocaine ex-users [60]; and that, outside of
the laboratory, craving is associated with consumption in smokers
[61] and cocaine users [62]. Cue-induced craving not only
characterizes periods of active use but endures for months,
possibly years, post-cessation [25–27]. Crucially, craving requires
effort to resist, which entails both costs (that can be rationally
traded off against benefits [63]) and the likelihood of failure due to
simple mechanistic fallibility [64]. Together, these predict that
there will be occasions when consumption results from stress
or encounters with drug-associated cues. This is part of the
explanation of both puzzles.
Nonetheless, cue-induced craving alone cannot provide a
complete explanation of the puzzles, for the simple reason that
it does not necessitate drug-taking: craving may be associated
with consumption, but it does not compel it. This is demonstrated
by converging lines of evidence from animal models and human
addiction studies establishing that the majority of animals and
humans alike respond to context-specific contingencies and
choose non-drug alternatives across multiple choice settings, cues
and craving notwithstanding [38, 65, 66].
Box 2: Episodic memory in humans and animals
“Episodic memory” was initially characterized by Tulving [138] as representations
of specific past autobiographical events, distinct from semantic and procedural
memories. Within this tradition, episodic memory has been conceived as in
essence both declarative and conscious. However, theoretical [32, 33, 139] and
empirical [140] work has repeatedly suggested that this conception is needlessly
limiting. An alternative is to characterize episodic memory by operationally
tractable features, namely: it is acquired in a “single-shot” manner, and it is
pervasively associative, linking both (i) items incidentally present within a single
event and (ii) multiple events with overlapping setting (“context”). These features
yield a unique retrieval profile: episodic retrieval can be spurred by incidental
associations experienced only once before, and can result in immediate,
involuntary, but nonetheless flexible, subsequent retrieval of related information
from the same or other events. Memory sampling builds on this profile to capture
the specific and outsized influence that current retrieval of a particular past event
has on decision-making (Box 1). Importantly, memories thus characterized may
be both declarative and conscious, but they are not required to possess these
features.
One key consequence of treating episodic memories as inclusive of unconscious
retrieval is the bridge constructed between studies of memory in humans and
animal models. There is increasing evidence that various animal species are
capable of retrieving particular past event representations for use in decision-
making [141–145]. Yet, absent declarative report, the question of the nature and
sophistication of animal consciousness is theoretically and empirically vexed
[146]. Operationalizing episodic memory enables integration of animal and
human studies within a unified decision-making framework, despite persistent
controversy surrounding determinations of consciousness in both animals [147]
and humans [148].
Nonetheless, the status of any particular episodic memory as conscious or
unconscious has obvious ramifications. For example, only conscious episodic
memories are available for declarative report; relatedly, deliberations that depend
on consciously-retrieved memories may result in choices less susceptible to post-
hoc confabulation (“choice blindness”) [149]. In addition, it is conscious memories
that prototypically figure in the construction of a self-narrative. Engagement with
each other, including people who suffer with SUD, as conscious subjects capable
of self-reflection on the role of our past in shaping present choices, therefore
offers distinctive ways to intervene and influence those choices (see Box 3) [150].
But this insight need not obscure the possibility that episodic memories and their
influence on decision-making may also be unconscious.
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Research in laboratory animals has demonstrated that although
rodents will escalate drug self-administration in deprived settings
where no alternative rewards are available, the vast majority will
choose food or social rewards over drugs in forced-choice studies
[65, 66]. Recent research suggests that social reward in particular is
a potent alternative for rodents, with 100% choosing it over drug
reward in the presence of drug-associated cues and irrespective of
sex, drug class, dose, training conditions, abstinence duration,
social housing, or “addiction score” based on a DSM-style model;
only delay or punishment of social reward choices affects choice
[67].
Human studies demonstrate similar flexibility in drug choice
and behavior. Although drug choices in SUD have features that
resemble habitual behavior [28], there is nonetheless limited
evidence in support of a habit theory of addiction [68]: in the
majority of cases, consumption appears to remain goal-directed
[69]. In forced-choice studies offering the immediate opportunity
to use crack cocaine or receive money reward, individuals with
SUD frequently choose money over drug reward [42]. In addition,
contingency management treatment is highly effective [70] and
offers positive reward contingent on drug-free urine samples in
the form of money, prizes, and most recently and successfully,
employment [71]; rates of use are cost-sensitive [72]; and
correctional services and courts can succeed in establishing
abstinence by imposing costs for failure [73]. Lastly, epidemiolo-
gical data suggests that the majority of people with SUD
(including those with physical dependence) recover without
clinical intervention by their late 20 s or early 30s [35].
These lines of evidence converge to establish that on the whole,
individuals with SUD choose non-drug alternatives in the presence
of drug options across multiple choice settings. Together, they
underscore that drug consumption, even in addiction, typically
remains purposive [74] and involves choice, as opposed to being
compelled by craving alone. Hence, although craving is part of the
solution to the puzzles of downward spiral and relapse, it cannot
be the whole of it. Given the evidence demonstrating flexibility in
behavior and responsiveness to incentives, why do individuals
choose to use drugs in both stages of the addiction process,
despite the evident costs?
The answer in part lies in a multi-factorial approach to how
choice can be biased in addiction. Individuals with SUD display a
range of decision-making anomalies, including reflective impul-
sivity, risk and ambiguity tolerance [75], impatience in delay
discounting [76, 77], reduced insight and self-awareness [78], and
denial of the severe consequences of use [79]. These may
influence subjective expected utility of drug and non-drug
choices, such that immediate, certain drug reward is strongly
preferred to the delayed, uncertain rewards of abstinence, while
drug risks are minimized and drug harms fail to be processed at
all. We propose that memory sampling is a further previously
unexplored factor that interacts with—and potentially provides a
cohesive mechanistic framework giving rise to [80]—many of
these decision-making anomalies. The selective sampling of
individual episodic memories of rewarding past drug use to
anticipate future possibilities can bias present choices towards
drugs; and, like incentive salience and craving, is affected by cues
and context. This mechanism can lead to individuals “chasing the
first high” when exposed to drug-associated cues and context:
imagining future possibilities of use that are ripe with rewards of
the sorts previously experienced and elaborated—even when
recent outcomes should encourage a more sober outlook.
THE MEMORY SAMPLING FRAMEWORK
The standard account of value-based choice assumes that choices
are based on values learned incrementally, over repeated
experience. Therefore, it cannot account for addictive choices,
where preferences persist despite repeated counterevidence, or
change suddenly after long periods of stability.
Memory sampling offers an alternative account, in which values
are estimated at the time of choice, guided by selected memories
of similar past experience [13–18, 20]. This model treats outcomes
of previous choices as “samples” of what may result from the
current decision. When these memories are reinstated, they serve
as evidence for the favorability of one option or another.
Therefore, choices depend on which memories come to mind at
the time of decision. In this way, memory sampling can explain
puzzling choices as a consequence of known cognitive and
neurobiological mechanisms of memory retrieval.
There are two critical relevant differences between memory
sampling and incremental RL:
Choice variability
In the standard incremental-learning model there is a degree of
“noise”—choices sometimes go against what would be predicted
based on learned values alone. But it has difficulty capturing
choices that consistently deviate from recent learning, e.g.,
appearing to “underweight” (ignore) or “overweight” (fixate) on
recent experiences [13, 17, 80, 81]. Memory sampling attributes
these variations to situational and environmental factors which
naturally persist between decisions, predicting consistent devia-
tions from RL of the sort observed in addiction (see Box 1 for a
further contrast of choice variability in both models).
Learning history
In the standard incremental-learning model, values are learned as
a running average, a single summary representation of past
rewards. In essence, previous experiences are lost, reflected only in
the learned value. Once a behavior is abandoned, the model
predicts that a return ought to be preceded by re-learning the
values that guided it. This is inconsistent with recent work
demonstrating that incidental reminders of individual past
decision outcomes and contexts meaningfully affect choice
[17, 18, 82–84]. Memory sampling explains these effects because
the full history of individual past outcomes and contexts is
available for sampling.
Memories of past experiences can be brought to mind by
incidental reminders, such as external stimulus (or internal
stimulus [85, 86] e.g., stress [6]). At a neural level, partial
reactivation of activity patterns formed during the initial
experience can lead to reactivation of all of the pattern. This
function, pattern completion [87], has particular relevance for
memory-guided decisions, because it predicts that memories of
past rewards can be reinstated on the basis of stimuli only
fleetingly associated with a given valuable outcome. Crucially, this
means that decisions are guided by memoranda recalled at the
time of choice (Box 1).
The extended set of associations and activity patterns that
follow memory retrieval are referred to as context memory [88, 89].
Computational and neurobiological models of context memory
emphasize the influence that context has not just on how
memories are organized, but on how they are retrieved [90]:
memories which share context tend to be retrieved together. For
instance: When trying to decide where to eat, we may recall a
night at a particular restaurant; context theories suggest that the
next recollection will likely be another restaurant nearby in space,
or an evening nearby in time. A recent study demonstrated that
which context is retrieved can have sizable and specific impact on
decisions for reward, separate from that of the initial retrieved
memory [18]. Therefore, factors that influence the process or
content of context retrieval—such as acute stress [91, 92]—should
also influence choice. A more direct analogy to drug relapse can
be seen in another study showing that acute stress prior to the
presentation of a conditioned fear cue can preferentially diminish
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recall of the extinction context—though not the cue itself, nor the
associated fear response [93].
Importantly, this context-guided “clustering” in memory retrie-
val is additive: speed and consistency is enhanced when retrieved
context is consistent with other internally-guided factors, such as
goals, intentions, and mood [85, 86, 94]. This is critical because the
dynamics of memory retrieval are instrumental in adjudicating its
influence on behavior [13, 95–97]: a memory that comes to mind
more quickly has a better chance of influencing choice, and of
overcoming competing values based on representations other
than individual episodic memories [13].
Lastly, memory’s role in decision-making is not simply to bind
us to the past. Extensive research demonstrates a role for memory
retrieval in imagining novel future scenarios [98, 99], in particular
the possible outcomes of decisions about the future being made
in the current moment [100–103]. Suggestively, these imagined
future scenarios may have an optimistic bias [104].
SOLVING THE PUZZLES
Memory sampling addresses both puzzles of (i) downward spiral
and (ii) relapse where previous models fail by introducing
flexibility to capture both persistent and also reawakened
preferences.
Spiraling into addiction:
“Crystallized Molly you can snort it and shoot it. My personal
choice was to inject it. I have injected crystal meth and everything
but literally the first time with Molly was so intense. Everyone says
the first time with anything is intense but for me I overdosed twice
in the same week. That was because I was chasing that first high. It
was so intense and I just wanted to feel it again. It was just way
overwhelming. You just want to chase that first high and that’s
why people just keep doing it especially where I’m from.” (from an
interview published on the forum Inspirations Youth)
Relapse:
“I was several years sober. Walking past a museum cafe at lunch, I
saw white table cloths, nice silverware, attractively dressed people,
perfectly framed by goblets of red wine. I was gripped by the sight
of a handsome couple, and overcome by the powerful thought that
I could and should be doing that—sipping red wine like a
gentleman with a beautiful woman in an elegant restaurant. All the
possibilities were alive—romance, love, joyful, generous conversa-
tion—and required, almost as a necessity, the red wine. The
experience repeats when I observe that sort of scene. No craving.
But my entire being is sucked into that experience… I don’t believe
I ever kissed a girl— let alone fell in love, etc—without spirits being
involved until I was over 45. My whole upbringing and history
taught me that alcohol made love possible.” (anonymous individual
in recovery, personal communication)
These reports describe the subjective experience of memory in both
phases of addiction. With respect to the downward spiral, the person
wants to re-experience the intensity of the first high. With respect to
relapse, they report being swayed not simply by craving for alcohol
itself, but by the allure of associated goods, e.g., love, sex, and
intimacy. Memory sampling allows us to model the effect of this
subjective experience, offering new understanding of both puzzles.
We propose that memory for drug choices develops over four
distinct stages (Fig. 1a–d). We illustrate this development via the
progressive cognitive implications of an initial drug-associated
cue. This cue can be an external stimulus previously experienced
during consumption (e.g., a physical object or location, or a social
setting); or an internal stimulus that previously led to spontaneous
drug-seeking (e.g., a mood or an emotion). Importantly, drug-
associated cues can be multitudinous as well as highly contingent:
incidental, ephemeral associations can reinstate entire patterns of
experience, even after long periods of dormancy.
The first stage occurs during early and highly rewarding
experiences, when drugs become associated with the cue in
question (Fig. 1a). In this stage, memory is critical not only to the
formation of the association between cue and intrinsic drug
reward, but equally to the formation of the association between
drug and other rewards present during these early experiences.
These associated rewards can be contingent upon or coincidental
with consumption, and may include e.g., increased confidence,
sociability, promiscuity, or feelings of safety. We call these drug-
associated rewards the drug “fantasy” as they are components of
both the memory of previous drug experiences and the episodic
Fig. 1 The four stages of memory-guided drug choice. a During early use, various memoranda (“cues”—such as people, places, things, or
even internal signals) are bound to the memory of positive drug experiences and also to drug-related “fantasies”—episodes which did not
occur, but which are imagined on the basis of the material provided by drug experiences and associated rewards. b Over persistent use, these
associations between cues, experience memories, and fantasies are strengthened, leading to rapid, involuntary reinstatement of the latter
when presented with the former. These signals carry positive reward, thereby encouraging consumption and explaining persistent use despite
lessening actual rewards and/or increasing negative consequences. c During treatment or other forms of abstinence, drug memories and
fantasies persist and can be recalled, but now have competition in their effect on action selection, in the form of “drug-inconsistent” mental
context: memories and imagined scenarios of alternative goods, e.g., of relationships, employment, health. Persistent abstinence suggests
these memories have become bound to widely available cues, or are otherwise easily recalled. d However, the original, drug-consistent,
memories are still available to recall. If a momentary influence—such as a shift in the environment, or an acute stressor—disrupts recall of
drug-inconsistent associations, their effect on behavior can reduce, allowing drug-related memories to prevail.
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simulation of future drug experiences. As drug choice and
consumption persist over time, these associations are elaborated
and strengthened, leading to the near-simultaneous retrieval of
memory and fantasy.
The second stage occurs when drug choice and consumption
become less rewarding (Fig. 1b). Though use may no longer be
reinforced by high reward, the early memories and associated
fantasies nonetheless persist and are triggered by the same drug-
associated cues. These associations between cues, early memories,
and drug fantasies evoke reward signals that affect decisions
similarly to externally-provided reward [13, 105]. In this way,
memory sampling explains the first puzzle of drug choice: the
downward spiral into addiction. Individuals with SUD may persist
in using drugs despite decreasing drug returns because they are
basing their choice on episodic memories of early highly
rewarding drug experience and associated drug fantasies.
Importantly, memory and fantasy can also play a role in
abstinence (Fig. 1c). A core aim of various therapies for SUD is to
instill a vivid sense of the value of a drug-free life: the clear
recognition of goods and rewards that are contingent upon
abstinence, such as improved personal relationships, employment
opportunities, health, and other drug-inconsistent personally
meaningful pursuits. This is a feature of twelve-step fellowships
[106, 107], group therapy [108], as well as harm reduction
approaches [109]; in addition, experience of life meaning has been
shown to predict better treatment outcomes for alcohol
dependence [110]; and, intriguingly, a recent study suggests that
meaning interventions reduce alcohol-cue interference in Stroop
tasks [111]. When faced with a drug-associated cue, people with
SUD must learn to recall and act to secure this alternative
rewarding future, by choosing against present consumption.
Over time, drug cues may as a result become associated not only
with drug memories and drug fantasies, but with the rewards of
a drug-free life (“drug-inconsistent associations” in Fig. 1c, d), as
abstinence persists and a series of choices are made against
consumption, and in favor of this alternative.
However, drug memories and fantasies do not disappear simply
because a competing association between drug cue and a drug-
free life is well established. Memory sampling therefore offers a
model for explaining the puzzle of relapse: relapse occurs
precisely when drug memories and drug fantasies– as opposed
to non-drug associations– are retrieved when cued thereby once
again exerting an influence on present decisions (Fig. 1d). A crucial
issue to preventing relapse is therefore to understand the factors
that disrupt the retrieval of cue-associated non-drug alternatives
and to design interventions accordingly.
Of the many factors that influence memory retrieval, acute
stress may be particularly important in explaining drug choices
post abstinence. Acute stress (i) triggers relapse (a process
correlated with atypicality in the hippocampal response to drug-
associated cues [3]); (ii) shifts reward decisions from goal-directed
to seemingly habit-like [112, 113]; and (iii) preferentially lessens
retrieval of contextually-linked memories [91–93] e.g., the drug-
inconsistent associations illustrated above. The precise mechan-
isms by which stress exposure yields each of the above effects
remains an open question. But a tantalizing possibility is that the
effects of stress on choice are mediated by the effects of stress on
memory retrieval. When context memories are not recalled,
decisions may be swayed by the first memory that comes to
mind [18]. Suggestively, recent work has shown that memory
recall prioritizes events with highly salient, surprising rewards
[114–116]–which may describe early, positive drug experiences;
and that stress may cue retrieval of past stressful occasions—
which, in SUD populations, may include or cause drug use [6, 85].
Together, these findings support two routes by which acute stress
may influence memory retrieval and yield relapse: (a) diminishing
retrieval of drug-inconsistent context memories, leaving initial
drug-related memories to guide behavior; and (b) promoting
retrieval of drug-consistent context memories and hence drug
memories themselves.
TRANSLATIONAL IMPLICATIONS
There are two routes by which research into the mechanisms of
addiction can inform treatment. It can illuminate why existing
psychological and pharmacological interventions are successful; or
it can suggest new interventions. Recognizing the potential role of
memory sampling in explaining drug choices promises both.
Complementing various therapies (see above), qualitative socio-
logical research has long suggested that overcoming SUD is
facilitated by the capacity to vividly and realistically imagine
an alternative drug-free life of personal value [46, 117–119].
Box 3: Implications for treatment
Memory sampling not only offers a theoretical framework for existing
interventions but, by drawing these together, suggests the following novel
treatment strategy:
(1) Delivery of a short course of therapy designed to help people with SUDs
produce a vivid and realistic image of an alternative drug-free life, containing
a clear set of personally meaningful and genuinely available drug-
inconsistent rewards.
(2) Training to voluntary recall the image.
(3) Once (2) is established, conditioning to develop an association between the
image and two kinds of stimuli: (i) drug-associated cues, so as to increase the
probability of spontaneous retrieval when opportunities to consume are
present; (ii) personal reminders such as smells [151] and app-based
individualized photos and pictures [108] (for a real-world example see
www.sobergrid.com), which can be voluntarily self-cued to facilitate retrieval.
(4) Clear instructions to retrieve the image using voluntary recall or self-cueing as
a strategy to support non-drug choices when risk of drug choices is high.
(5) The use of pharmacological memory enhancers, such as acetylcholinesterase
inhibitors, may also be considered during the short course of therapy (1) and/
or the conditioning phase (2).
Box 4: Limitations and directions for future research
• The treatment strategy outlined in Box 3 is speculative and the clinical protocol
for implementing each stage 1–5 needs to be made precise; similarly, studies
exploring memory sampling within SUD population groups have not yet been
conducted.
• Though the phenomenon of “chasing the first high” is widely documented,
rigorous qualitative work probing recollections of early and motivating drug
experiences is required. Recent technological advances in momentary
experience reporting [61, 152] and large-scale text analysis [153] promise
new possibilities in this direction [154, 155]. A firmer classification of the types,
valence, and behavioral relevance of memories and associated drug fantasies
may provide valuable material for implementation of individualized treatment.
• The role of acute stress requires further investigation. Is there a distinct role at
retrieval as opposed to encoding? What are the mechanistic consequences on
memory retrieval—does acute stress cease extended recall, change the content
of what is recalled, or slow all memory retrieval, leaving the first to dominate
choices made under time pressure? Each of these mechanisms has support
from the memory literature, and may coexist. Variation in the prevalence of one
or other mechanism may be a valuable individual difference measure,
predicting susceptibility to kind of relapse trigger. Finally, does the impact of
stress on memory retrieval change with the adapted cortisol response often
observed in chronic drug users 156?
• While many studies suggest that drug-related memories are strongly encoded
and persistent [156–159], little is known about the precise ways in which drugs
alter memory encoding. The prominence of surprising rewards in memory recall
[114, 116] may arise from event boundaries introduced at encoding that
establish the surprising reward memories as the primary event in a new context
[115], a feature known to promote resistance to extinction [160]. However, the
link between these findings and drug experiences has yet to be firmly
established.
• Memory sampling predicts that aspects of memory encoding and retrieval
should be instrumental to relapse. Neural circuits known to support episodic
and relational memory and those identified as critical for multiple forms of
relapse show considerable overlap, particularly in medial temporal lobe (MTL)
structures such as subiculum, entorhinal cortex, and dentate gyrus, as well as
ventral and dorsal medial prefrontal cortex [161]. It is unknown whether these
structures support functions common to both sets of behaviors. A fruitful
avenue for further research may be to integrate the extensive sets of findings in
both literatures, in particular the detailed subparcellation of function of MTL
regions in memory encoding and retrieval [162].
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In addition, recent experimental studies converge on an emerging
theoretical framework that posits memory-guided simulation as a
core component of intertemporal choices in all domains
[100, 101, 120, 121]. A set of targeted studies [102, 103] probing
the effect of episodic future thinking about drug-inconsistent future
goods on rates of delay discounting in smokers is concordant with
this outlook; as is recent work on orbitofrontal deficits and targeted
neural activation in animal models of addiction [122]. These findings
suggest that individuals with SUD can be motivated to abstain not
simply because they recognize that drugs have negative con-
sequences, but because they recognize that abstinence has positive
consequences, in so far as it brings personally meaningful drug-
inconsistent rewards into reach [7].
Much existing treatment uses psychological and pharmacolo-
gical interventions to block the association between drugs and
positive reward, e.g., naltrexone and opiate-replacement therapy
aim to do so directly by acting on opioid receptors, while
cognitive-behavioral therapy and techniques such as motivational
interviewing aim to refocus attention away from drug reward onto
the negative consequences of use. But once established via real-
world experience, memories are difficult, if not impossible, to
extinguish [41, 93, 123–126]. Evidence for the idea that extinction
is mediated by creation of new memories, rather than unlearning
of previous associations, is found in recent observations that
extinction and fear memories are supported by parallel engrams
[127, 128]. The memory sampling framework presented here is
consistent with these findings from neurobiology, and also
supports the clinical and sociological insight that it can be
effective to focus treatment on the development of the capacity
to imagine an alternative drug-free life when confronted with
drug cues: to harness what has been called “meaning in life” [111]
or “a stake in conventional life” [118] to recovery. Rather than try
to break the association between drug cues and drug reward,
treatment should aim to strengthen existing and/or create new
associations between drug cues and drug-inconsistent rewards
(Fig. 1c), which can compete with and over time potentially
dominate drug reward in memory retrieval.
CONCLUSION
We propose a framework for explaining drug choices in
addiction as guided by memories of individual past experiences
of drug use. The memory sampling model predicts that such
choices can exhibit persistence beyond that captured by
incremental learning models, consistent with known drug
choice behavior in the downward spiral into addiction and
relapse alike.
This framework offers a new perspective on existing, but
undertheorized, treatment strategies, as well as suggesting new
approaches that center on the life narrative of the person who is
suffering. Ultimately, this may facilitate targeting of individual
contextual influences, by providing a mechanism for their effect
on choice.
The idea that memories can guide choices toward undesirable
outcomes might seem cause for despair: if memory can never fully
be extinguished, what hope is there for fully overcoming its
effects? But the model presented here offers an opportunity for
rethinking conceptual frameworks that sometimes threaten to
equate people who struggle with addiction with automatons.
Specifically, by linking drug choices to the retrieval of memories in
the moment, it suggests that the effect of the past on the present
is always dynamic—and so potentially subject to interventions
leading towards a more desirable future.
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